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THE RIGHT OF A MINOR TO INDEPENDENT 
STATUS - THREE MODELS 
Yitshak Cohen* 
This article examines a minor’s right to independent status in matters 
of family law, the importance and benefits of that right, the interests it 
competes with, and possible approaches for the future. The right of a minor 
to independent status was initially intended to resolve a concern that 
parents, while undergoing divorce proceedings and focused on their own 
interests, might compromise the interests of their children. I argue that this 
concern has developed into a legal presumption that parents compromise 
the interest of minors in divorce proceedings. However, this presumption 
contradicts the assumption, fundamental to every legal system, that parents 
are natural guardians who safeguard the interests of their children. In 
addition, the development of a minor’s right to independent status has 
several negative effects on divorce proceedings, among them: contractual 
uncertainty, lack of finality of judgment, waste of judicial resources, and 
prolonged divorce proceedings between parents.  
This article offers the following three models for protecting the 
interests of the minor: (i) requiring the court to comprehensively examine 
the interests of the child and then granting a presumption of validity to the 
court’s determination—that determination should also serve as binding 
precedent for a subsequent court; (ii) legislating clear considerations and 
guidelines for defining the best interests of the child and thereby reducing 
future relitigation; and (iii) appointing independent representation for the 
minor. These models may serve to create a more appropriate formula for 
balancing the competing interests in family law proceedings. 
                                                            
* Associate Professor of Law, Ono Academic College, Law School; Visiting 
Scholar, Columbia Law School (2012-2013); Visiting Professor, McGill University 
(10/2013); Ph.D., Bar Ilan University Law School. LL.M., Bar Ilan University Law 
School; LL.B., Bar Ilan University Law School. I am grateful for the insightful 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the United States, the number of divorce proceedings is almost 
unmanageable.1 Accordingly, the number of children involved in such 
proceedings is growing every year. 2 The decisions made during a couple’s 
divorce proceedings have a crucial effect upon the lives, personal 
development, tranquility, and security of that couple’s children. These 
                                                            
1 See Randall W. Leite & Kathleen Clark, Participants’ Evaluations of Aspects 
of the Legal Child Custody Process and Preferences for Court Services, 45 FAM. 
CT. REV. 260, 260 (2007) (“Throughout the United States, domestic relations courts 
experience large, often unmanageable caseloads. In fact, domestic relations cases 
are the largest and fastest growing segment of state-court civil caseloads.”) 
(citations omitted).            
2 See John David Meyer, The “Best Interest of the Child” Requires Independent 
Representation of Children in Divorce Proceedings, 36 BRANDEIS J. FAM. L. 445, 
445 (1998) (“Divorce is a common occurrence that disrupts the lives of over one 
million children each year, affecting their psychological and physical well-being.”) 
(citations omitted). 
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decisions will affect the children even though the children are usually not 
parties to the proceedings that take place between their parents. The courts 
have expressed concern over the conflicts of interests between parents and 
children during divorce proceedings.3 When parents are involved in a 
struggle over their interests and personal freedoms, they might neglect or 
even compromise the interests of their children. In order to protect a child’s 
interests, the courts established and strengthened the minor’s right to 
independent status by determining that decisions or agreements made in the 
proceedings between the parents are not binding upon the minor.4 Children 
are therefore allowed to subsequently reopen such agreements in a new 
proceeding initiated on their behalf.5 In this relitigation proceeding, the 
interests of the children appear before the court as separate and distinct from 
the matters between their parents.6 This is the first opportunity for the child 
to be heard. As a consequence, prior decisions that affect the minor might be 
changed. 
However, excessive use of the minor’s right to independent status 
detracts from the finality of judgments, and can result in certain issues 
remaining open and unresolved.  7 This uncertainty might also be detrimental 
to the motivation of the couple to resolve their dispute. The parties may 
wrongfully use the minor’s right to independent status in their own conflict 
as a couple. It may even burden limited judicial resources with the 
relitigation of claims, while other parties with new matters wait to come 
before the court. However, even though the potential for abuse exists, 
limiting and restricting minors’ rights to independent status might be 
detrimental to the interests of the children if their interests are compromised 
in favor of their parents.  
In the first Part of this article, I will examine the importance of the 
right to independent status, its necessity for the protection of minors, its 
place in legal systems today, and possible trends for the future. This right 
                                                            
3 See, e.g., Jaramillo v. Jaramillo, 823 P.2d 299, 307-08 (N.M. 1991); Ford v. 
Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 193 (1962). 
4 CA 404/70 Evron v. Evron, 25(1) PD 373, 378 [1971] (Isr.). 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Leite & Clark, supra note 1, at 260-61 (“From a legal point of view, divorce 
traditionally required a couple to address grounds for the divorce, property 
distribution, alimony, child custody, and child support. Today, only those issues 
associated with children remain open issues in most states.”) (citation omitted).  
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does not exist in a legal vacuum, and it has significant implications for the 
remaining interests involved in a family law matter. Therefore, in the second 
Part of this article, I will evaluate the present balance between contractual 
certainty, the finality of judgments, and the right of a parent not to be 
repeatedly brought before the court for relitigation versus the best interests 
of the child and his right to independent status. In the third and final Part of 
the article, I will consider different practical models that have been used to 
address a minor’s right to independent status. Throughout the article I will 
draw from American, Israeli, and other foreign law to provide examples and 
examine difficult scenarios. This examination may assist in building a 
formula that more appropriately balances the competing interests in family 
law matters. 
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MINOR’S RIGHT TO INDEPENDENT STATUS 
A. Finality of Judgment 
The principle of finality of judgment is fundamental to legal systems. 
Simply put, finality of judgment means that a matter conclusively decided 
by a court of competent jurisdiction will not be relitigated between the same 
parties.8 The principle of finality of judgment includes three cumulative 
conditions: final resolution by a competent court, identical litigants, and the 
same claim.9 The rationales at the basis of this principle include prevention 
                                                            
8 See, e.g., Jullie Steakley & Weldo U. Howell, Ruminations on Res Judicata, 
28 SW. L.J. 355, 355 (1974) (“The doctrine of res judicata…[states] that a cause of 
action once finally determined, without appeal, between the parties, on the merits, 
by a competent tribunal, cannot afterwards be litigated by new proceedings either 
before the same or any other tribunal”) (citations omitted).  
9 See, e.g., Amstadt v. U.S. Brass Corp., 919 S.W.2d 644, 652 (Tex. 1996) (The 
elements of res judicata are: “(1) a prior final judgment on the merits by a court of 
competent jurisdiction; (2) identity of parties or those in privity with them; and (3) a 
second action based on the same claims as were raised or could have been raised in 
the first action”); Wayne Cnty. v. Detroit, 233 Mich. App. 275, 277 (1998) (“Under 
the doctrine of res judicata, ‘a final judgment rendered by a court of competent 
jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their 
privies, and, as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving 
the same claim, demand or cause of action.’” (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
1305 (6th ed. 1990)). 
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of relitigation, the right of a litigant not to be repeatedly called back to court, 
the concern over conflicting decisions made by different courts on the same 
issues, and the efficient use of judicial resources.10 Therefore, once a court 
has granted a final judgment, a procedural barrier arises before the parties, 
preventing any relitigation between them on the same cause of action.11  
The importance and effectiveness of this principle has resulted in its 
expansion on several levels. For example, finality of the judgment is not 
restricted only to the parties who were formally present during the first 
action, but may also bar the initiation of a proceeding by others who are 
privy with the parties to the earlier action. 12 The classic example of this sort 
of privity, as discussed in this article, is the natural guardianship of parents.  
In matters associated with their children, parents are authorized to represent 
them in legal actions.13 The legal significance of such representation is, 
among other considerations, that a decision concerning the minors is binding 
upon them and prevents them from relitigating the same matter. The 
rationale behind obligating a minor by a legal proceeding in which he was 
not even present is sufficiently clear: parents appropriately protect the 
interest of their children.  In representing the children, it is assumed the 
parents do the most to ensure that the children’s interests are thoroughly 
considered by the court.14 Therefore, finality of judgment is intended to 
prevent the minor's relitigation. 
B. Natural Guardianship 
 The natural presumption that parents safeguard the interests of their 
children is not as simple as it seems. This presumption is challenged by the 
                                                            
10 CA 9085/00 Shitrit v. Sharvat Brothers Ltd, 57(5) PD 462, 475 [2003] (Isr.). 
11 CA 246/66 Klosner v. Shimony, 22(2) PD 561, 583 [1968] (Isr.). 
12 See, e.g., Getty Oil Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 845 S.W.2d 794, 800-01 (Tex. 
1992) (People can be in privity in at least three ways: (1) they can control an action 
even if they are not parties to it; (2) their interests can be represented by a party to 
the action; or (3) they can be successors in interest, deriving their claims through a 
party to the prior action); Mathison v. Public Water Supply Dist. No. 2 of Jackson 
Cnty., 401 S.W.2d 424, 431 (Mo. 1966) (“to make one ‘privy’ to an [earlier] action 
he must have acquired his interest in the subject matter of the action subsequent to 
the commencement of the suit or rendition of judgment.”). 
13 Capacity and Guardianship Law, 5722 – 1962, 380 Laws of the State of Israel 
(LSI) 120, §§ 14-15 (1962) (Isr.). 
14 See Getty, 845 S.W.2d at 800-01.  
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concern that parents who are in the midst of divorce proceedings, struggling 
over their own personal matters, including freedom—and sometimes even 
motivated by the desire for revenge—may unknowingly or unintentionally 
compromise the interests of their minor children. When one spouse focuses 
on proving his own parenting skills and abilities, or the other spouse’s lack 
thereof, that spouse may fail to properly consider the children’s interests. 
The picture presented to the court may be distorted if the atmosphere in the 
divorce proceedings is controversial and charged. Since the spouses are 
concerned with personal gain, the interests presented before the court are 
their own and not necessarily the interests of their children.15 In addition, 
divorce proceedings sometimes cause a rift between children and their 
parents. Consequently, parents may not be sensitive to or aware of the needs 
of their children.  Moreover, the interests of the parents may sometimes be 
at odds with their children’s interests. For example, while in principle, broad 
visitation arrangements with both parents are in the best interests of the 
child, it is certainly possible that the noncustodial parent will prefer more 
restricted visitation that will not burden him in finding new work or in 
establishing a new family. 
Legal systems in the United States are aware of the gap that exists 
between the interests of parents and those of their children during divorce 
proceedings.16 In the case of Jaramillo v. Jaramillo, the court stated: 
     
When, however, the interests of a third party (or parties—
the children) are not only significantly affected by the 
outcome of the litigation but indeed are paramount in 
determining that outcome, placing on one party the burden 
of establishing that his or her interests are the ones that 
should be vindicated can subordinate the interests of the 
third party—who may be absent and may not even be 
represented—in the clash over the other two parties’ 
competing hopes and desires.17  
 
                                                            
15 Donald N. Bersoff, Representation for Children in Custody Decisions: All 
That Glitters is Not Gault, 15 J. FAM. L. 27, 31 (1977). 
16 See, e.g., Short v. Short, 730 F. Supp. 1037, 1039 (D. Colo. 1990); Taff v. 
Bettcher, 646 A.2d 875, 878 (Conn. App. 1994). 
17 Jaramillo v. Jaramillo, 823 P.2d 299, 307-08 (N.M. 1991). 
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Similarly, the alienation that might occur between parents during 
divorce proceedings could negatively impact their parental judgment with 
respect to the interests of their children.18  
C. The Right of the Minor to Independent Status 
The concern that parents might compromise the interests of their 
children is not merely an academic or theoretical issue. A proceeding 
between parents, especially when uncontested or resolved by agreement, 
does not bind a subsequent court in matters that only concern the child.19 
Such matters are brought before a court apart from earlier proceedings that 
involved the parents.20 A parent should not be permitted to purchase his 
personal freedom at the cost of his child’s peace and safety, even if the court 
approves such an agreement. 
In Guillermo v. Guillermo, the Family Court in Mexico confirmed a 
divorce agreement, which determined, among other issues, that the father 
would pay fifteen dollars a week for child support.21  Eight months 
thereafter, the mother brought a claim against the father, on behalf of the 
child, before a different court of parallel jurisdiction.22 She argued that the 
amount of support did not meet the needs of the child.23 The court held that 
in some cases the mother might be so anxious to end her marriage that she 
may compromise her children’s needs for a matrimonial decree.24 
The court further stated that there had been no change in either the 
child’s or the father’s circumstances since the initial judgment.25 The court 
noted that the only change was simply that of the mother’s own situation.26 
While she had previously been constrained by her matrimonial dispute, eight 
                                                            
18 Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 193 (1962) (“Unfortunately, experience has 
shown that the question of custody, so vital to a child's happiness and well-being, 
frequently cannot be left to the discretion of parents. This is particularly true where, 
as here, the estrangement of husband and wife beclouds parental judgment with 
emotion and prejudice.”). 
19 CA 42/49 Mashkeh v. Mashkeh, 3(1) PD 88 (1950)(Isr.). 
20 Id. 
21 Guillermo v. Guillermo, 252 N.Y.S.2d 171, 172 (1964). 
22 Id. 
23 See id. at 172-73. 
24 Id. at 173. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
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months later she was free to litigate.27 This change, for the first time, 
enabled the mother to independently raise the issue of support of her minor 
child.28 The court indicated that the ruling of the previous court relied only 
on the divorce agreement of the parties: there was no discussion, 
interrogation process, or examination of the needs of the child.29 The court 
concluded that according to the income of the father, he was required to pay 
child support in an amount fifty percent higher than the amount previously 
determined.30 The court stated that when matrimonial litigation is 
uncontested or results in a settlement between the parties, the incidental 
provision of child support cannot control a subsequent court where the 
interests of the child are first considered separate and apart from the earlier 
proceedings between the parents.31 
 
No parent should be able to bind a child by buying 
matrimonial freedom at the price of selling a child's material 
or other security, even if a court approves such agreement . . 
. . No child support decree should be sacrosanct if 
“incidental” to, and inequitably incidental to, the problems 
of adults.32 
 
A minor has no control over the process or the strategies used. 
Therefore, the findings should not obligate him. In sum, because children 
are not privy to their parents in divorce proceedings, they should not be 
bound by the results of proceedings that take place between their parents.33 
The most important implication of these concerns is the development 
of the minor’s right to independent status. Accordingly, a voluntary 
agreement between the parents in matters concerning the child is not binding 
                                                            
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 178. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 181. 
32 Id.  
33 See, e.g., Simcox v. Simcox, 546 N.E.2d 609, 611 (Ill. 1989) (“We, therefore, 
hold that children are not privies of their parents in dissolution proceedings and, as 
such, are not bound by findings of paternity in such proceedings unless they are 
parties to the proceedings.”) (emphasis in original). 
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upon the child—even if approved by the court.34 Merely including the 
minors in the proceedings and having the parents declare that they are 
creating an agreement in the interests of their children does not make any 
difference.  35 The child is allowed to initiate a new legal proceeding in a 
matter that was previously determined by the court, even if there is no 
material change of circumstances that would otherwise be necessary to 
justify relitigation. 
It is interesting to note that under the Israeli legal system, as opposed 
to that in the United States, the change that takes place in the status of the 
minor also affects those circumstances in which the right to independent 
status applies. For many years, the presumption that parents might 
compromise the interest of their children applied exclusively to issues of 
child support. In all remaining matters, the agreement between the divorcing 
parents was binding upon the minor. 36 In recent years, however, the concern 
that parents may compromise the interests of their children has arisen with 
                                                            
34 Id. 
35 In the Israeli legal system, it is insufficient to merely determine that the 
agreement meets the needs of the child and serves his best interest. Two procedural 
conditions must be fulfilled for it to be binding upon the minor: (1) a separate claim 
on behalf of the minor, and (2) a separate proceeding in his matter, that is not 
connected to the remaining issues of the divorce. See, e.g., CA 404/70 Evron v. 
Evron, 25(1) PD 373, 378 [1971] (Isr.). In my opinion, Israeli law identifies three 
stages in the development of a minor’s right to independent status: In the 1960s and 
1970s, the determining standard was procedural. In the 1980s, the courts adopted a 
more substantive model. They sought to identify if decisions concerning the minors 
were indeed made in their interest, whether or not a separate proceeding was 
brought on their behalf. See, e.g., CA 289/82 Dauba v. Dauba, 36(4) PD 625, 628 
[1982] (Isr.); CA 544/82  Hamami v. Hamami, 38(3) PD 605, 608 [1984] (Isr.). In the 
last decade the courts again adopted the procedural standard, and in that way 
broadened a minor’s right to independent status. In this third stage, even if it is 
determined that the decisions made concerning a child are good, the second court 
will reverse them if they were not made in a separate proceeding on behalf of the 
minor. See HCJ 2898/03 Anonymous v. The Supreme Rabbinical Court, 58(2) PD 
550, 563 [2004] (Isr.). The Supreme Court recently decided that the substantive 
model should be determinative. See HCJ 4407/12 Anonymous v. The Supreme 
Rabbinical Court (Feb. 7, 2013), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).  
36 CA 1/81  Nagar v. Nagar, 38(1) PD 365, 387 [1984] (Isr.).  
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respect to a broader variety of issues. Thus, the presumption now applies to 
child custody and visitation,37 as well as matters of education in Israel.38 
The establishment and broadening of the minor’s right to independent 
status is intended to benefit the minor and to protect his interests. The law 
must protect minors from anyone who might compromise their interests, 
even if that person happens to be their parent. This sort of protection is of 
the utmost importance.  
II. EXCLUSION OF OTHER INTERESTS IN FAMILY LAW 
Judicial decisions must balance different interests. The emphasis of 
one interest is generally at the expense of another. In this Part, I will more 
closely examine the negative costs that the right of a minor’s independent 
status has on other interests. 
A. Res Judicata and the Burden of Proof 
Among the first interests to be compromised by the minor’s right of 
independent status are the interests incorporated in the doctrine of res 
judicata, and principles concerning finality of judgment, such as prevention 
of relitigation, functus officio,39 the right of a party not to repeatedly face 
claims on the same matter; prevention of burdening the court with 
relitigation while new claims are waiting to be heard;40 and other finality 
considerations.41 Certainly, the principle of res judicata in family law is 
                                                            
37 HCJ 2898/03 Anonymous v. The Supreme Rabbinical Court, 58(2) PD 550, 
563 [2004] (Isr.). 
38 HCJ 9539/00 Eitan v. The Supreme Rabbinical Court, 56(1) 125, 133 [2001] 
(Isr.).   
39 CA 9085/00 Shitrit v. Sharvat Brothers Ltd, 57(5) PD 462, 475 [2003] (Isr.). 
40 Penelope Pether, Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal of Private Judging in 
the U.S. Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1435, 1528 (2004) (“Finally, ‘[t]he doctrines of 
res judicata and collateral estoppel are designed to preserve judicial resources by 
preventing relitigation of issues that had been thoroughly aired in a prior 
proceeding’” (quoting Jill E. Fisch, The Vanishing Precedent: Eduardo Meets 
Vacatur, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 325, 340 (1994))).  
41 See NINA SALTZMAN, RES JUDICATA IN CIVIL PROCEEDINGS 3-12 (Ramot, 
Univ. of Tel Aviv 1991) (in Hebrew); CA 219/87 Artzi Ltd. v. Shemesh Hadar Ltd., 
43(3) PD 489, 497 [1989] (Isr.). 
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more flexible than is customary in other areas of law.42 I have written more 
extensively elsewhere about this flexibility with respect to child support, 
custody, and alimony. 43 In those matters, the court determined that when 
there is a change in circumstances, the final decision of the court may be 
modified to suit the new reality.44  
In order to balance the interest of adjusting a payment amount to meet 
changed circumstances, on one hand, and the interest of the finality of 
judgment on the other hand, the court requires that the change be a “material 
change of circumstances.”45 This balance requires two distinct conditions 
that are intended to offset and “make up for” the conflict with the principle 
of the finality of judgment. First, the burden of proving changed 
circumstances is placed upon the individual initiating the later proceeding 
and requesting to modify the earlier decision.46 Second, not every change in 
                                                            
42 Barry B. McGough & Gregory R. Miller, Domestic Relations, 56 MERCER L. 
REV. 221 (2004) (“The court of appeals, however, held that ‘the doctrine of res 
judicata is less strictly applied in divorce and alimony cases, including cases 
dealing with child support issues’” (citing Dial v. Adkins, 265 Ga. App. 650, 651-52 
(2004) (emphasis in original))). 
43 See generally Yitshak Cohen, Issues Subject to Modification in Family Law: 
A New Model, 62 DRAKE L. REV. 101 (forthcoming 2015).  
44 See id. at 2-6. 
45 See, e.g., Joan G. Wexler, Rethinking the Modification of Child Custody 
Decrees, 94 Yale L.J. 757, 766 (1985); accord id. at 779 (“Each of the approaches 
to modification applications described above represents an attempt to balance 
competing policy interests. Trying to balance the policies behind the res judicata 
doctrine on the one hand, and the policies in favor of making the best-advised 
contemporary determination of the child's welfare on the other, the traditional 
changed circumstances doctrine holds that not just any changed circumstances, but 
only substantial ones, should warrant changing custody.”); Sally Burnet Sharp, 
Modification of Agreement-Based Custody Decrees: Unitary or Dual Standard? 68 
VA. L. REV. 1263, 1264 n.9 (1982) (“The change of circumstances standard is based 
on principles of res judicata.”); Richard Montes, Harold J. Cohn, & Shelley L. 
Albaum, The Changed-Circumstances Rule and the Best Interest of the Child, 24 
L.A. LAW. 12, 12 (2001) (“[O]ne of the purposes of the rule [i.e. changed 
circumstances] is to recognize the finality of judgments and protect the parties and 
the child from harmful and needless relitigation of the issues of custody and 
visitation.”). 
46 The burden for modifying maintenance awards rests with the party seeking 
modification, and the decision of whether to grant such modification is within the 
sound discretion of the trial court. See, e.g., Pala v. Loubser, 943 N.E.2d 400, 409 
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circumstances is sufficient. Instead, a material change in circumstances is 
mandatory, and meeting this burden of proof is not an easy task.47 
In contrast, with respect to the right of the minor to independent 
status, the conflict with the principle of res judicata is not balanced in any 
way. On the contrary, the burden of proof is placed upon the individual 
requesting to maintain the previous ruling without change.48 Only a few days 
subsequent to a final determination in the matters concerning a couple, one 
parent may initiate a new claim on behalf of the child, without being 
required to prove a material or any other change in circumstances.49 
Therefore, this right of independent status actually reverses the original 
fundamental presumption: it assumes that the representation of the minor by 
his parents in the first proceeding was not fitting representation, and thus the 
minor is allowed to initiate a new proceeding to modify the result.50 The 
burden shifts and is placed on the party that objects to initiating a new 
proceeding.51 In other words, the burden is borne by the individual wishing 
to maintain the determination that has already been adjudicated—not the 
party requesting to modify it. Accordingly, the individual bearing the burden 
must prove that in the earlier proceeding the representation of the minor was 
appropriate.52 This requirement contradicts the natural presumption, which 
assumes that a parent adequately represents his child and faithfully fulfills 
his duty to protect the minor’s interests. Thus, by changing the customary 
premise, the court assumes, instead, that the representation of the child by 
the parents is inappropriate. Anyone arguing that the parental representation 
                                                                                                                                           
(Ind. Ct. App.) (affirming trial court's termination of spousal maintenance), transfer 
denied, 950 N.E.2d 1212 (Ind. 2011).  
47 See Wexler, supra note 45, at 766; Montes, Cohn, & Albaum, supra note 45, 
at 12.  
48 Ruddock v. Ohls, 91 Cal. App. 3d 271, 277 (1979) (“If a judgment 
determining the existence of the parent-child relationship is to be binding upon the 
nonparty minor child, respondent has the burden of proving the minor was a party to 
the action or in some other manner is bound prospectively by the findings and 
judgment in the parents' marital dissolution action.”). 
49 Famcourt  37181/97 L.Ti v A.Ti (Nov. 26, 2002) Nevo Legal Database (by 
subscription) (Isr.). 
50 HCJ 6103/93 Levi v. The Supreme Rabbinical Court, 48(2) PD 591 [1994] 
(Isr.). 
51 Id.  
52 See Ruddock, 91 Cal. App. 3d at 277. 
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is proper bears the burden of proof.53 The question of the burden is far more 
than a theoretical matter. It actually determines, as a matter of policy, who 
will win in the litigation and who will lose.54 
B. Contractual Certainty, Rehabilitation, and Motivation to Settle 
The right of independent status, which is intended to focus on the 
interest of the minor, might be used, instead, by one of the parents as a way 
of avoiding his own obligations. A spouse—who just consented to a range 
of separation and divorce conditions, including matters of joint property, 
custody, or support—can go back and object to the same agreement, 
                                                            
53 See Jaramillo v. Jaramillo 823 P.2d 299, 307 (N.M. 1991). Placing the burden 
on the party that wishes to maintain the present situation was of concern to the court 
in this matter. The court determined that even though the matter involved minors, it 
is appropriate to determine a presumption favoring the party that wishes to maintain 
the existing situation, while the burden of proof should be imposed on the individual 
requesting the change. The court stated:  
 
When parents are operating under a joint custody arrangement and 
one of them seeks to alter the arrangement, it makes perfectly 
good sense to impose a presumption in favor of the parent who 
wishes to continue to operate under the joint custody decree and 
to place on the party wishing to change the decree the burden to 
produce evidence that the arrangement is no longer workable and 
needs to be changed.  
 
Id. The court added and explained that as a rule, placing the burden on one of the 
parents to justify maintaining the existing situation could result in focusing on the 
question of whether or not that party met the burden, and the interests of the minor 
might be hurt. Thus the court stated: “But beyond this presumption in favor of an 
existing joint custody arrangement, further presumptions for or against the 
relocating parent and the one who remains behind only frustrate achievement of the 
ultimate goal of determining the arrangement that will best serve the child's 
interests” Id. at 307. In our matter, the burden in the proceeding is not intended to 
focus on the lack of trust in the parents but on the question of whether the requested 
change is in the best interests of the child.   
54 Id. (“In the typical bipolar model of adversary litigation—in which one 
party's interests are pitted against those of the opposing party—the use of 
presumptions and the assignment of burdens of proof probably effectuate, in most 
instances, the relevant policy goals involved in determining who wins and who 
loses.”) 
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requesting it be changed on the grounds that he is not bringing his own 
claim, but the claim of the minor.55 The court sometimes defines such claims 
as fictitious when it becomes clear that the minor does not even know how 
to express his needs or what he is lacking, or when the initiation of the 
proceeding is neither the minor’s initiative nor his idea.56  
The presumption of compromising the interests of the minor might 
therefore be wrongfully taken advantage of by one of the spouses. In a 
separate proceeding, that spouse could argue that the child had not been 
properly represented, and thus he might avoid his own obligations under a 
prior agreement with the other spouse. Therefore, the right of the minor to 
independent status might detrimentally impact the interest of the contract 
and contractual certainty, making it difficult for the couple to plan their 
individual futures.57  
In addition, the duality in the position taken by the court is not easily 
understood. On one hand, when a parent creates an agreement with his 
spouse, the court does not trust the parent to protect the interests of the 
minor. On the other hand, after some time has passed, when a parent brings 
a separate claim against the other spouse on behalf of the child, such trust is 
granted. 58 Yet, it is possible that the parent’s actual purpose in the new claim 
is the continuation of the dispute with the other spouse. If the concern is that 
a parent may be focused on his own interests and not on those of his child, 
then it is unclear why a proceeding brought prior to the divorce is 
differentiated from one brought afterwards.59 
                                                            
55 See D.N. 4/82 Kot v. Kot, 38(3) PD 197, 209 [1984] (Isr.). 
56 See CA 411/76 Sher v. Sher, 32(1) PD 449, 454 [2003] (Isr.).   
57 See, e.g., CA 508/70 Natovich v. Natovitch, 25(1) PD 603, 615 [1971] (Isr.).  
58 See CA 289/82 Dauva v. Dauva, 36(4) PD 625, 628 [1982] (Isr.).  
59 This problematic duality is also expressed in Hunter v. Hunter, 170 Cal. App. 
2d 576, 583 (1959) (holding that a parent may not waive reasonably due present and 
future support on behalf of his or her children, but that a parent may still make a 
binding agreement about such support). What is the meaning of the validity of an 
agreement between them if one party is allowed to change it in the name of the 
minor? What is the difference if a parent is allowed to change the agreement in his 
own name, or in the name of the minor? In Van Buskirk v. Todd, for example, we 
found similar duality: on the one hand the mother is seen as one who acted on 
behalf of the child and represented his interests. On the other hand, when the minor 
requests to reopen the proceedings, in contradiction to the agreements that were 
reached by the mother, the mother’s action is ignored. 269 Cal. App. 2d 680, 687 
(1969) (“[T]he defendant could not get the case reversed by claiming for the first 
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 The minor’s right to independent status creates a sort of balance of 
terrors, which threatens the parties and could become an incentive to prevent 
economic rehabilitation, or at least hide it, due to concerns over relitigation. 
For example, the economic rehabilitation of one spouse could encourage the 
second spouse to initiate new litigation. A claim could be brought for 
increased child support from the first spouse due to his improved level of 
income. The flexibility of an agreement between the spouses, and the 
possibility of breaching it, also negatively impacts their motivation to 
resolve their dispute by agreement. The minor’s right to independent status, 
as noted, places the burden on the individual requesting to preserve the 
existing agreement so that the party wishing to revise it is in a more 
advantageous position. This determination thwarts the completion of the 
agreement.  
In addition, one should also consider that maintaining the contract 
between the spouses might serve the interests of the minor as well. In a 
home where the parents constantly argue and the atmosphere is filled with 
hate and bitterness, it is desirable and in the interest of the children that the 
tension be brought to an end and that the parents divorce. In other words, 
there could be situations in which the child is interested in the separation of 
his parents no less than in his economic well-being.  60 A low level of child 
support or less than customary visitation does not necessarily mean that the 
interest of the child has been compromised and that representation by his 
parents is inappropriate. 
From another perspective, the minor’s right of independent status 
serves as a way to protect the weaker spouse. The first proceeding between 
the parents takes place before the divorce decree is awarded, while the 
second proceeding takes place afterwards. Following the divorce, the 
spouses appear with “equal strength” in a monetary claim. It is not without 
reason that suits on behalf of minors are sometimes filed only days 
following the divorce. During this short period of time, the expenses for the 
                                                                                                                                           
time on appeal that the child had no standing in court because he did not have a 
guardian ad litem on the paternity issue. We will presume that the mother acted in 
the manner of a guardian ad litem, and it is clear that she acted in behalf of the 
minor consistently with the duties of a guardian ad litem.”) It is unclear how the 
mother is viewed in one proceeding as acting on behalf of the child by obligating 
the father, while at the same time she is viewed in another proceeding as acting 
contrary to the child’s interests in her relationship with the child.  
60 CA 411/76 Sher v. Sher, 32(1) PD 449, 454 [2003] (Isr.).   
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child did not really increase, the prices of commodities did not actually 
skyrocket, and the minor did not suddenly mature and discover that he lacks 
adequate support. Only one thing changed: the parent who initiates the 
proceeding on behalf of the child is freed from the limitations of the divorce 
proceedings and is not concerned about a lack of cooperation from his 
spouse.61  
In Israel, for instance, the courts have welcomed relitigation in the 
name of the minor, and have viewed such relitigation as an adjustment to the 
divorce proceedings. Adjustment is required because there is a gap between 
the ruling of the rabbinical court and the ruling of the Civil Court, which 
will be filed upon relitigation.62  
To that end, Israel courts have even established the minor’s right to 
independent status. This right of independent status can be used by courts 
not only to protect the interest of the minor, but to no lesser extent, to 
protect the interest of the weaker spouse as well. Indeed, typically the 
second proceeding only deals with issues associated with the minor, and not 
directly with matters between the couple. However, through the issues 
related to the minor it is also possible to balance and amend other concerns 
that are clearly those of the couple. In essence, it is not a matter of separate 
entities, and there is no absolute differentiation between payments due to the 
minor and payments due to the custodial parent. 
  Undoubtedly, the minor’s right to independent status and the 
development of that right is an excellent means of protecting the interest of 
helpless minors in a legal proceeding. This right is also an excellent tool for 
                                                            
61 An interesting judgment in New York argues that the “release” itself 
following a divorce decree constitutes a “change in circumstances.” See Guillermo 
v. Guillermo, 43 Misc.2d 763, 773 (1964) (“As soon as the parent's marital freedom 
is adjudicated, the parent’s ‘circumstances’ thereby ipso facto are changed by the 
new freedom itself. Having been safely separated, divorced or the marriage 
annulled, the parent for the first time is in a radically ‘changed’ position—to litigate 
freely, to strive vigorously for an equitable order of support without fear of refusal 
by the other parent to co-operate in the separation, divorce, or annulment by 
consenting to appear, or by declining to controvert the proof. Here in the Family 
Court, the Judge is for the first time given both sides of the circumstances as 
contended for by the respective parents, and he can find the facts as they are rather 
than as a separation agreement and mute parents made them appear to another 
court.”) (italics in original). 
62 Ariel Rosen Zvi, The Rabbinical Court, the Religious Tradition and the 
Community—A Very Narrow Bridge, 3 HAIFA L. REV. 173, 178 (1995).  
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safeguarding the interest of the weaker spouse. But when considering these 
important advantages it is impossible to ignore the potential disadvantages 
and implications of that right.  
By presuming that parents compromise the interests of their children, 
courts are in conflict with other fields of law.63 In other areas of law, courts 
do not presume that parents compromise the interest of their children. For 
example, in tort law, parents routinely represent their children. Parents 
regularly act on behalf of their children through litigation and settlement 
agreements.64  
But, family and tort law are very different. In tort matters, the parents 
are not typically opposing each other whereas in family law the parents are 
typically in the midst of a controversy. A “battle” between the parents can 
cloud parental judgment. Moreover, in family law, the presumption of 
neglecting the interest of the minor is relevant even when the parents reach 
an agreement without going through a conflict.65  
In every other field of law, parents are presumed capable of 
appropriately protecting the interests of their children.66 So, it should be 
questioned whether the American and Israeli courts went too far in 
broadening the minor’s right to independent status. It may be worthwhile to 
reexamine whether the path chosen by the legal systems in the United States 
and Israel is correct. Arguably, the United States and Israeli systems allow a 
court of competent jurisdiction to conduct an entire proceeding while 
knowing that its decisions are not binding and may subsequently be 
relitigated just a few days after the first adjudication. The broadening and 
establishment of the minor’s right to independent status might add to the 
uncertainty and lack of peace and security that already troubles minors in 
                                                            
63 See CA 404/70 Evron v. Evron, 25(1) PD 373, 378 [1971] (Isr.). 
64 See Ministry of Justice, the Committee on Children and the Law, Report of 
the Subcommittee on Education, at 36 (Feb. 2003), available at 
www.justice.gov.il/MOJHeb/HavaadLeZhuyot/YezugNifrad  [hereinafter Rotlevy 
Committee Report] (indicating that the committee did not examine the independent 
representation of the minor in the area of torts since it did not see this as important 
and urgent; the Committee recommended minor tort independent representation be 
reviewed in the future review).  
65 CA 363/81 Fayga v. Fayga, 36(3) PD 187, 189 [1982] (Isr.).   
66 Capacity and Guardianship Law, 5722-1962, 380 Laws of the State of Israel 
(LSI) 120, §§ 14-15 (1962) (Isr.) ("The parents are the natural guardians of their 
minor children. . . . The guardianship of the parents includes the obligation and the 
right to care for the needs of the minor . . . and the authority to represent him.") 
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divorce proceedings. It is not clear whether the important benefit of 
independent status is greater than its cost. 
III. THREE MODELS FOR BALANCING THE COMPETING INTERESTS   
The matters described above may be resolved with an appropriate 
formula for balancing the competing interests: the interest of the child and 
his right to independent status, as compared with, contractual interests and 
the finality of judgments. In this section, I will examine three legal models 
for achieving a balance among these factors. 
Model A: Consideration of the Interest of the Minor by the Court 
The simplest model requires the court to closely examine the interests of 
the minor when it makes decisions or approves agreements on matters 
concerning the minor. This requirement should bring about trust in the 
court’s faithful performance of its duties. The initial assumption is that the 
court appropriately considers the interests of the minor and thus properly 
accounts for the child’s interests. Whoever wishes to argue otherwise should 
bear the burden of proof. This would encourage parents to reach a final 
agreement. 
The present situation, where there is a presumption against the first 
hearing, raises certain difficulties when one court allows itself to open an 
agreement that was previously confirmed by another court. The subsequent 
court is not a court of appeals, but shares concurrent jurisdiction with the 
first one. Customarily, courts at the same level of jurisdiction will not 
intervene in each other’s decisions.  
However, one must also consider the limited ability of the court to 
ensure that an agreement submitted for approval is indeed in the best 
interests of the child. Although the court is able to subpoena witnesses and 
gather evidence, it does not take it upon itself the role of managing a 
proceeding. Its ability to access evidence is also limited. The court does not 
seek new information, call upon experts, or even question them.  
 
[U]nder most states' laws a court must review an agreement to 
determine whether it is in the child's best interests. . . . Despite the 
appearance of review, however, independent judicial inquiry is 
difficult because of the inaccessibility of facts that might dictate a 
different result. The result is the worst of both worlds: parents enter 
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the divorce process with their autonomy to make arrangements for 
their children officially abridged, and yet arrangements that might 
truly be detrimental to children are unlikely to be identified.67 
 
Despite these objective difficulties, there are instances in which the 
proceeding between the parents is binding upon the children without 
requiring further action.68 Additional litigation, separate from the other 
issues of divorce, may not even be necessary. Similarly, the minor may not 
need to be added as a party to the proceeding. An “identity of interests” 
between parent and child is often sufficient to render the proceedings 
binding upon the child. In other words, when the parent shares common 
interests with the minor whom he represents, the legal proceeding is viewed 
as binding on the minor as well, even if the minor takes no part in the legal 
proceeding. For example, in Armstrong v. Armstrong, children whose 
parents went through divorce proceedings requested an increase in the 
amount of their support.69 Their mother brought a claim on their behalf.70 
These proceedings sought a result contradicting the prior proceeding 
between the parents.71 Normally, a court assumes the interest of the children 
may be overshadowed by the interest of the parents and thereby 
compromised. In this case, however, the interest of the mother was identical 
to that of the children and therefore her representation of the children was 
proper.  The court determined: 
 
The doctrinal reach of the res judicata bar extends, however, to 
those persons “in privity with” parties . . . .We have previously held 
that privity exists where the person involved is “ . . . so identified in 
interest with another that he represents the same legal right.” . . . In 
the present case, plaintiffs’ mother was entrusted with their care and 
custody and was a proper representative of their interests. While in 
similar situations we can conceive of a commingling of interests of 
parent and child in the negotiation of a marital dissolution 
agreement to the degree that the future interests of a child are clearly 
                                                            
67 AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 5 (2002). 
68 See, e.g., Armstrong v. Armstrong, 15 Cal. 3d 942, 951 (1976). 
69 See id. at 945. 
70 See id. at 945-47. 
71 See id. at 945-46. 
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and deliberately subordinated to the present interests and advantages 
of a parent, the record before us discloses no such circumstances. 
For this reason, we conclude that plaintiffs are bound by the 
judgment in the divorce action to which their mother was a party.72 
 
Identity of interests is the standard that determines whether a minor is 
bound by a proceeding in which he was not present.73 When identity of 
interests is appropriately applied during the initial divorce proceedings, the 
court’s determination is binding upon a subsequent court.74 
The American and Israeli legal systems should require that the court’s 
confirmation of the agreement between the parties not be a mere rubber 
stamp, but instead, be aimed at ensuring proper and sufficient protection of 
the interests of the minor. In other words, a clear presumption should be 
established that the prior court’s confirmation incorporates within it the 
concern for and examination of the needs of the child. Ideally, this 
presumption would also determine that the prior legal proceeding is binding 
on the minor.  
However, since a court’s decision does not presently prevent subsequent 
proceedings, each case actually remains open, even when the court has 
                                                            
72 Id. at 951 (citations omitted); accord Stevens v. Kelley 57 Cal. App. 2d 318, 
323-24 (1943); Murdock v. Eddy 38 Cal. App. 2d 551, 553-554 (1940); Ruddock v. 
Ohls, 91 Cal. App. 3d 271, 276 (1979) (“Under California law children who are not 
parties to a divorce action still may be bound by some aspects of a marital 
dissolution proceeding if the interests of the child are adequately represented by one 
of the parents.”).  
73 See Amstadt v. U.S. Brass Corp., 919 S.W.2d 644, 653 (Tex. 1996) (“To 
determine whether subsequent plaintiffs are in privity with prior plaintiffs, we 
examine the interests the parties shared. . . . Privity exists if the parties share an 
identity of interests in the basic legal right that is the subject of litigation.”) (citation 
omitted).  
74 See Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 210 (1933) (“The provision 
which the Georgia law makes of permanent alimony for the child during minority is 
a legal incident of the divorce proceeding. As that suit embraces within its scope the 
disposition and care of minor children, jurisdiction over the parents confers eo ipso 
jurisdiction over the minor's custody and support. Hence, by the Georgia law, a 
consent (or other) decree in a divorce suit, fixing permanent alimony for a minor 
child is binding upon it, although the child was not served with process, was not 
made a formal party to the suit, and no guardian ad litem was appointed therein.”). 
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confirmed the divorce agreement between the parties.75 Today, the 
confirmation by the court is not considered final because the court acts 
according to the definitions and the terms determined by law—such as the 
“best interests of the child,” which can be interpreted with flexibility. Courts 
have broad discretion and, therefore, each court may view the issues 
differently, resulting in relitigation with respect to the level of child support, 
visitations, etc. 
This problem can be resolved, or at least limited, by determining clearer 
definitions for identifying the child’s best interests. The following section, 
examines such a model. 
Model B: Clear Legislative Guidelines 
In the United States legal system, before state child support guidelines 
were set forth for determining child support, court decisions relied on vague 
standards such as “the best interest of the child,” and “substantial change in 
circumstances.”76 Reliance on these abstract terms was problematic for the 
legal system because courts interpreted the terms differently.77 This broad 
judicial discretion resulted in inconsistency when courts awarded economic 
child support and determined the adequacy of spousal support. Later courts 
found the earlier court decisions to be erroneous and sought to change them, 
even if no change in circumstances had occurred. 78 This prevented finality of 
judgment in family law cases involving decisions regarding children. 
                                                            
75 See, e.g., CA 404/70 Evron v. Evron, 25(1) PD 373, 378 [1971] (Isr.).  
76 Jeffrey C. Sorenson, Changing the Changed Circumstances Requirement: A 
New Standard for Modifying Permanent Custody Orders, 23 J. JUV. L. 90, 97-99 
(2003) (concluding that the best interests of the child should replace the standard of 
change in circumstances). But cf. Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgment: Against the Best 
Interest of the Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 11-29 (1987). 
77 See, e.g., Elster, supra note 76, at 4-8 (arguing the best interests of the child 
standard is problematically indeterminate). 
78 Hill v. Hill, 620 P.2d 1114, 1119 (Kan. 1980) (“[W]here a custody decree is 
entered in a default proceeding, and the facts are not substantially developed and 
presented to the court, the trial court may later, in its discretion, admit and consider 
evidence as to facts existing at the time of the earlier order, and upon the full 
presentation of the facts the court may enter any order which could have been made 
at the initial hearing whether a ‘change in circumstances’ has since occurred or 
not.”). 
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Historically, the United States Congress has been concerned about 
possible harm to minors not awarded adequate child support.79 Awarding 
low amounts of support places a heavy burden on American assistance 
organizations.80 In the mid-1980s, Congress expressed concern “about the 
adequacy of child support awards.”81 In 1984, Congress conditioned its aid 
to states and assistance organizations on the development of clear guidelines 
for child support.82 In 1988, Congress further demanded that these 
guidelines be given the validity of a presumption in legal proceedings.83 
Thus, a litigant who wished to overcome that presumption had to provide 
justification.84 In light of this requirement, guidelines have been defined in 
each of the fifty states.85 Child support requirements are usually formulated 
based on estimates of the minimal expenses spent on children in two-parent 
families.86 The amount of basic child support is calculated as a certain 
percentage of parental income.87  
In every state, clear standards and guidelines have been established 
for calculating child support and enforcing payment.88 The establishment of 
                                                            
79 Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations, 
8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 1, 2 (2001). 
80 In the past, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDS), and today, 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). See Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105; 
42 U.S.C. § 601 (1997). 
81 Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, supra note 79, at 13. 
82 42 U.S.C.A. § 667 (West). 
83 Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100–485, § 126, 102 Stat. 2343, 
2346 (1988) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A § 667 (West)). Congress passed the Family 
Support Act (FSA) in 1988 and created the U.S. Commission on Interstate Child 
Support. The FSA required that by October 1989 each state adopt a child support 
law using a mathematic formula to establish a support award guideline.  
84 Id. 
85 Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, supra note 79, at 13. 
86 Id.  
87 Id. (“All states now calculate the basic child support obligation as a 
percentage of parent earnings.”). 
88 Id. State law governs family law, and each state is allowed to create its own 
laws. See Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 167 (1899) (“[T]he whole subject of the 
domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the 
State, and not to the laws of the United States.” (citing In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 
593-94 (1890))); see also Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971). 
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these guidelines encourages the finality of child support judgments in 
disputes.  
Similarly, the system in Australia was also criticized for its 
inconsistency due to a lack of guidelines.89 These objections brought about 
reform in the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (CSA).90 In order to 
improve the processes of assessment and payment, the new Australian law 
removed from the courts the authority to determine the level of economic 
child support and transferred it to an administrative body that operates 
according to a structured formula.91 The formula provides quick and easy 
determinations of the level of child support that the non-custodial parent is 
required to pay.92 Initially, it was possible to appeal the decision of the 
administrative body to the courts. Today, the CSA is the entity from which 
parties can request changes in set formulas.93 The removal of this authority 
from the courts narrowed the discretion in the matter and resulted in greater 
certainty and finality. 
Under the Canadian legal system, the courts also had broad discretion 
with no real guidelines.94 Unavoidably, a situation of uncertainty and 
inconsistency developed with respect to the level of economic child support. 
This vagueness was detrimental to the willingness of the parents to 
voluntarily reach agreement regarding the level of support, and it 
encouraged them to initiate legal proceedings.95 As a result, the Federal 
Child Support Guidelines were created in Canada. The Guidelines are 
designed to ensure certainty, consistency, restriction of the court’s 
                                                            
89 Belinda Fehlberg & Mavis Maclean, Child Support Policy in Australia and 
the United Kingdom: Changing Priorities but a Similar Tough Deal for Children?, 
23 INT’L J.L. POL. & FAM. 1, 3 (2009). 
90 See Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth) Part 5 (Austl.), available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/csa1989294/.  
91 Id. at Part 5. 
92 Id.  
93 Fehlberg & Maclean, supra note 89, at 6-7.  
94 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CANADA, CHILDREN COME FIRST: A REPORT TO 
PARLIAMENT REVIEWING THE PROVISIONS AND OPERATION OF THE FEDERAL CHILD 
SUPPORT GUIDELINES 1 (2002), available at http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/fl-
lf/child-enfant/rp/pdf/v1.pdf. 
95 Id. 
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discretion, and especially important to our matter—the finality of 
judgment.96 
In contrast, the Israeli legal system does not clearly define the level of 
child support obligation. The payment amount is determined according to 
the personal (religious) law of the individual required to pay the support.97 
Under this law, only the father is obligated to provide the “necessary 
support” for his children.98 That term is certainly abstract. Thus, the rabbinic 
court and the civil court, which have parallel jurisdiction with respect to the 
level of child support, have different outcomes.99 On June 5, 2006, the 
Israeli minister of justice appointed the Committee to Examine the Issue of 
Child Support in the State of Israel, chaired by Professor Shifman.100 On 
September 20, 2012 the committee presented its recommendations.101  The 
findings of the committee show that awards are even inconsistent among the 
judges in civil court.102 While the court has determined a minimum level of 
child support, the determination of the maximum level of support is more 
problematic. 103 Therefore, the committee recommended the establishment of 
a formula for child support according to the existing Australian model.104 
                                                            
96 See Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.3 §15 (2nd Supp.) (Can.); see also Federal 
Child Support Guidelines, SOR/97-195 (Can.), available at 
http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/rsc-1985-c-3-2nd-supp/latest/rsc-1985-c-3-
2nd-supp.html. 
97 See Family Law Amendment (Maintenance) Law, 5719 – 1959, 276 Laws of 
the State of Israel (LSI) 72, § 2 (1959) (Isr.) (“A person is responsible for spousal 
support, according to the rules of the personal law applicable to him”).   
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Report of the Committee to Examine the Issue of Child Support in the State 
of Israel (Shifman Committee), at 106 (Sept. 2012) [hereinafter: Shifman 
Committee Report]. 
101 Id. at 3. 
102 Id. at 25; see also Mor Yogev & Ayelet Giladi, Mom Give Me Equality, 3 
Hearat Din 1, 6 (2006); HCJ 5969/94 Aknin v. The Rabbinical Court (Haifa), 50(1) 
PD 370, Para. 11 [1996] (Isr.). (acknowledging that different interpretations are 
given to the required level of child support but stating that this is not a desirable 
conclusion).    
103 Famcourt 3400-09-10 Anonymous v Anonymous, (Nevo 29/10/2010) Para 
19.  
104 Shifman Committee Report, supra note 100, at 59 (“The bill formulated by 
the committee is based primarily on the Australian model founded on the 
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This formula will prevent judicial discretion, and hopefully even the need 
for separate relitigation of a claim on behalf of the minor. 
Under both the United States and the Israeli legal systems, the issues 
of custody and visitation have no uniform standards and are thus subject to 
relitigation.  
 
From a legal point of view, divorce traditionally required a 
couple to address grounds for the divorce, property 
distribution, alimony, child custody, and child support. 
Today, only those issues associated with children remain 
open issues in most states. Additionally, while all 50 states 
have enacted some form of standardized child support 
calculation and child support enforcement networks, both 
child custody and visitation remain often hotly contested 
issues in divorce proceedings.105 
 
Therefore, uniform standards, through legislation, may bring about 
finality to these matters. Uniform guidelines will undoubtedly contribute to 
the finality of judgment, strengthen the principles of res judicata and 
contractual certainty, and prevent misuse of the minor’s right to independent 
status in the dispute between spouses.  
Model C: Independent Representation for the Minor 
Some legal systems do not allow parents to enter agreements on 
behalf of their children. While parents may discuss their own matters in 
connection with divorce agreements, they know in advance that the issues 
involving their children are not subject to negotiation at all.  
It is worth examining whether a similar model should be adopted in 
all legal systems, so that parents in divorce proceedings will be able to 
determine only matters affecting themselves—such as distribution of family 
property—but not matters associated with the minor. For this proposal to be 
enacted, it should be considered in conjunction with the model described 
below. 
                                                                                                                                           
assumption that a fixed percentage of the joint parental income is allocated to the 
needs of their children.”). 
105 Leite & Clark, supra note 1, at 260-61 (citation omitted).   
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It seems that one of the most practical proposals for resolving the 
concerns discussed above, or at least for preventing their exacerbation, is 
including the minor in the proceedings between his parents by the 
appointment of an independent representative for the minor.106 This modern 
approach recognizes the need for independent representation of the minor, 
due to the concern that the parents may subordinate the minor’s interests in 
favor of their own. The independent representation for the minor ensures 
that the process of factual investigation will be protected, and that parents 
will not subsequently relitigate subjects that have already been determined. 
Preserving the finality of judgment is of the utmost importance, and 
independent representation serves this goal.107 John Speca and Robert 
Wehrman analyzed all the cases in the Missouri regarding the inherent 
jurisdiction of the court to appoint temporary representation for a minor, and 
came to the clear conclusion that children have their own rights, and only 
receive adequate protection in divorce proceedings when they have 
independent representation.108 Despite this modern approach, only 
Wisconsin requires a separate attorney to independently represent a minor in 
divorce proceedings.109 The remaining states grant broad judicial discretion 
for appointing a guardian ad litem for a minor in a legal proceeding: 
 
Several other states have adopted the provisions of the 
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, which provide the 
court with discretionary power to appoint a guardian ad 
litem for a minor or dependent child in proceedings for 
support, custody, and visitation.110 
                                                            
106 The authority to appoint representation for the minor exists under Israeli law. 
See Capacity and Guardianship Law, 5722-1692, 16 LSI 106, § 29 (1962) (Isr.). It 
requires limiting the natural guardianship of the parents, showing the court a special 
reason justifying the limitation, and hearing the parents: “If guardianship of one 
parent was limited, the court may, in addition to the parents, to appoint a guardian 
for minor for matters be prescribed by him.” Id.  
107 S. v. S., 595 S.W.2d 357, 360 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (“First, the modern trend 
of authority recognizes the necessity for independent representation of a child when 
the parents in a dispute over the custody of the child do not, in any proper sense, 
protect the best interests of the child.”). 
108 John Speca & Robert L. Wehrman, Protecting the Rights of Children in 
Divorce Cases in Missouri, 38 U. MO. KAN. CITY L. REV. 1, 38-40 (1969). 
109  Meyer, supra note 2, at 446 (citing Wis. Stat. Ann. § 767.045 (West 1993)).   
110 Id.  




But, several of the states within the United States grant judicial 
discretion to appoint independent representation for the matters of minors.111 
In certain American states, the appointment of the minor’s representative 
and that representative’s responsibilities and duties are broadly determined 
in legislation 112 including the representative’s independent investigation of 
the evidence.113 Many scholars argue that it is not sufficient to rely on the 
courts or parents to protect the interest of minors.114 Instead, these scholars 
argue that independent representation must be appointed for the minor.115  
The importance of independent representation is emphasized in the 
adversary system of law, in which the court relies on the evidence of the 
parties and does not gather it by itself.116  
The Australian legal system also defined the principles for appointing 
independent representation, giving parties a non-exhaustive list of possible 
arguments for independent representation.  117 In the Canadian legal system, 
there are still no clear instructions as to when and how to appoint an 
independent representative, but the courts have broad discretion to make 
such determinations. 118 Canadian judicial decisions offer three different 
                                                            
111 Tari Eitzen, A Child’s Right to Independent Legal Representation in a 
Custody Dispute, 19 FAM. L.Q. 53, 67 (1985).  
112 See, e.g., CAL. RULES OF COURT, RULE 5.240 (2014); UNIFORM MARRIAGE 
AND DIVORCE ACT §310 (1973). 
113  2012 S.C. Acts 361, § 63-3-830 (“(A) The responsibilities and duties of a 
guardian ad litem include . . . (1) representing the best interest of the child; (2) 
conducting an independent, balanced, and impartial investigation to determine the 
facts relevant to the situation of the child and the family….”). 
114 See, e.g., Robert F. Drinan, The Rights of Children in Modern Family Law, 2 
J. FAM. L. 101, 107 (1962) (asking whether it would make sense for a court to 
provide detailed obligations of parents); Robert W. Hansen, Guardians Ad Litem in 
Divorce and Custody Cases: Protection of the Child's Interests, 4 J. FAM. L. 181, 
181-82 (1964). 
115 Drinan, supra note 114, at 103. See generally Hansen, supra note 114.  
116 Marshall A. Levin, Guardian Ad Litem in Family Court, 34 MD. L. REV. 341 
(1974) (“[W]ithout meaningful representation of the interests of the child, the 
adversary system cannot properly effectuate the legal test of what is in the ‘best 
interest’ of the child.”).  
117 Stefureak v. Chambers, [2004] 6 R.F.L. 6th 212, para. 73 (Can.).  
118 Puszczak v. Puszczak, [2005] 56 Alta. L.R. 4th 225, para 11 (Can.) ABCA 
426, para. 11 (Can.) (“The case law in Canada is not highly developed in setting out 
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models for characterizing the nature of independent representation of 
minors: “the amicus curiae, the litigation guardian, and the child advocate.” 
119 
The child advocate model is similar to other approaches that view the 
independent representation of the minor as the most efficient way to ensure 
the minor is accorded “zealous” representation. This model emphasizes the 
autonomy of the minor as a client and the importance of her participation as 
a party to the legal proceeding. This representation advances the interest of 
the child because the court does not view the child as an individual requiring 
protection and consideration, but rather as an individual with rights. Thus 
explains Barbara Ann Atwood, a leading scholar: 
 
[T]hose who endorse a child's attorney model emphasize the 
child’s basic right to have his or her wishes presented by a 
zealous advocate. Proponents emphasize the child client’s 
autonomy and the value to the child and to the court of the 
child’s participation in the proceedings. Under this 
approach, the child’s dignity interests are served when the 
child has a representative committed to advocating the 
child's preferences.120  
 
This model may balance the concern over possible harm to the child’s 
interests, and result in the finality of judgment. However, while this model 
seems tempting, it would burden the legal proceeding. Another “zealous” 
attorney joining the dispute between the spouses might prolong the 
proceedings and delay the resolution of the conflict.121 In addition, the 
                                                                                                                                           
guidelines to determine when counsel should be appointed in private custody cases 
and how that should be accomplished.”). 
119 Dormer v. Thomas, [1999] 65 B.C.L.R. 3d 290, para. 44 (Can.).  
120 Barbara Ann Atwood, Representing Children: The Ongoing Search for 
Clear and Workable Standards, 19 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 183, 194 
(2005) (citations omitted). 
121 For example, in the case of A.M., an attorney was appointed for the inde-
pendent representation of a minor. This attorney requested, on behalf of the minor, 
to bring his own evidence, to cross-examine witnesses, to retain an expert on his 
behalf, etc. See A.M. (Guardian ad litem of) v. K.A.A.M., [2008] N.J. No. 
267 (“The child argued that he was granted a role as a fully participating party and 
sought to call evidence, question witnesses and retain experts. The mother agreed 
with the child. The father objected to the child making applications”).  
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minor’s attorney might increase the animosity between the spouses. Lucy 
McGough, another leading scholar, argues that adding another attorney to an 
already charged atmosphere could cause more disagreements, additional 
lack of clarity regarding the role of the court as a protector of minors, and 
increase the costs of the proceeding.122 For these reasons, an attorney is only 
occasionally appointed to represent a minor.123 
Due to these concerns, McGough argues that the appointment of an 
attorney for independent representation is not justified in regular 
circumstances, though it would be correct to grant the court authority to 
appoint an attorney in exceptional instances where the interests of the 
parents severely conflict with those of the children.124  In that context, the 
appointment of the guardian may be limited only to the specific proceedings 
(i.e. litigation guardian). This temporary guardian can also serve as a 
mediator or arbitrator between the parents and provide recommendations to 
the court. McGough suggests not appointing an attorney in this role, since 
an attorney generally lacks professional training in child development and 
family dynamics. She proposes that it would be preferable to appoint 
professionals in the therapeutic field.  125 This approach is similar the model 
used in Canada for appointing an independent representative—a friend of 
the court (amicus curiae). 
                                                            
122 Lucy S. McGough, Protecting Children in Divorce: Lessons from Caroline 
Norton, 57 ME. L. REV. 13, 26 (2005) (“Throwing another lawyer into the fray, 
however, may not be the solution. The third attorney may compound or even create 
unnecessary adversarialness in the trial, cause additional confusion about the court's 
role as the protector of the child, produce delay, and add to the costs of the case. 
The persuasiveness of these counterarguments explains why separate counsel is 
rarely appointed for the child.”). 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 27. 
125 Id. at 26-27 (“More states authorize the appointment of a guardian ad litem 
for the child. The guardian need not be an attorney . . . . Aside from needless 
expense and role confusion, lawyers or guardians typically have no special 
knowledge of child development or family dynamics . . . .why not appoint a child 
psychiatrist or child psychologist who can conduct an investigation, interview all 
parties, analyze the child's best interests, and tell the court how it should decide?”) 
(citations omitted). 
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Similarly, in Israel, the Rotlevy Committee126 looked into this matter 
within the Israeli legal system. The committee found that independent 
representation of a child by an attorney does not cause the lengthening of the 
proceedings.127 To the contrary, since the attorney is not subject to 
considerations of bureaucracy and budget, the attorney makes sure that the 
matter proceeds quickly.128 The Rotlevy Committee also rejected the 
concern over additional figures in the life of the child, arguing that it is 
possible to require the attorney to maintain an ongoing and trustworthy 
relationship with the child throughout the entire proceeding.129 Formal 
measures could also be established to ensure permanent representation. The 
Rotlevy Committee determined that clear and defined criteria for the 
appointment of representation safeguards parental authority.130 The 
Committee determined that, from a legal perspective, it is preferable that the 
duty of representation remain with an attorney, and not with a welfare 
officer or similar official who may be subject to the considerations of 
welfare offices, policy, budgets, and additional factors that are not always 
consistent with the interests of the child.131 The Rotlevy Committee further 
stated that the approach of the welfare officer is through a broad family 
perspective that does not focus specifically on the child as required for 
independent representation.132 The committee members did not discuss how 
independent representation could influence the other issues of concern 
raised in this article.  
Decisions reached in proceedings where an independent 
representative is appointed for the minor should be given the validity of a 
final judgment. Such matters should not be open to future relitigation based 
on the claim that the interest of the minor did not receive proper 
representation. 
                                                            
126 The Rotlevy Public Committee on Children and the Law, chaired by Judge 
Saviona Rotlevy, was appointed by the justice minister in Israel on June 27, 1997. 
This committee was divided into six subcommittees. One of the subcommittees 
dealt with “Independent Representation of Children in Civil Proceedings.” The 
subcommittee’s report was submitted to the Minister of Justice in February of 2003. 
See Rotlevy Committee Report, supra note 64. 
127 Id. at 97. 
128 Id. at 100.  
129 Id. at 102.  
130 Id. at 103. 
131 Id. at 114.  
132 Id. at 115.  
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Some legal systems include therapeutic professional assistance units 
associated with the family court. The professionals’ appointment as 
independent representatives for minors is easy to arrange and may lessen the 
costs of the proceedings, assuming the professionals are qualified to serve 
on behalf of the minors. This method is effective because it adds the minor 
as a party to the proceedings, ensuring the finality of judgment and 
protecting the interests derived from it. Legal systems that provide attorneys 
for minors, such as these, contribute significantly to the efficiency of these 
types of proceedings. 133  
In light of the different models for appointing legal representation for 
a minor, either the legislator or the court should resolve the remaining 
uncertainties. The duties, obligations, and limitations of independent 
representation need to be clearly defined. As long as the roles of the 
representatives for minors are uncertain, the court will refrain from 
appointing them. 
CONCLUSION 
Parents in the midst of divorce proceedings may compromise the 
interests of their children. The increased risk of conflicts of interests 
between parents and children, coupled with the worsening of the scope and 
severity of divorce disputes, have strengthened the presumption that parents 
may compromise the interests of their children. In response to apparent 
concern for the minor’s right to independent status, the courts allow 
relitigation in divorce proceedings. Courts allow relitigation even if the 
children are considered in the initial proceedings and the parents make 
statements regarding their interests in the children. The burden of proof is 
borne by the individual wishing to maintain the previously adjudicated 
determination—not by the child requesting the modification. The right to 
independent status, therefore, provides important protection for the interests 
of the minor. 
                                                            
133 A.I. v. Ontario (Director, Child and Family Services Act), [2005] 136 CRR 
(2d) 13, para. 141-42 (“The OCL [Office of the Children’s Lawyer] is statutorily 
mandated to act in the best interests of the children it represents. It is axiomatic, 
therefore, that a position taken by the OCL is one which the OCL believes to be in 
the best interests of the child. . . . The OCL is frequently an invaluable resource to 
this court, and I find this case no exception. I found the OCL's involvement to be 
very helpful.”). 
Vol. 10.1]   Yitshak Cohen 
 
 32 
 On the other hand, this right enables courts to reverse earlier judicial 
decisions, based on the argument that the decisions were detrimental to the 
minor. The presumption of compromising the interests of the minor and its 
impact on the possibility of relitigation is detrimental to contractual 
certainty and finality of judgments. A spouse who just consented to a range 
of separation and divorce conditions can object to that agreement and 
request that the agreement be modified by bringing a claim on behalf of the 
minor.   
This sort of relitigation enables one spouse to prolong the dispute: it 
creates an incentive to prevent economic rehabilitation out of concern for 
possible future relitigation, negatively impacts the motivation of a couple to 
resolve their dispute by agreement, wastes precious judicial resources and 
brings about relitigation while other new claims are waiting to be heard for 
the first time, and misleads the couple who believes the legal proceeding 
will allow each of them to begin a new path in life. Courts may have gone 
too far in establishing the right of the minor to independent status given that 
the right may even be an obstacle to the minor.  
Three models better balance the competing interests. The first model 
requires the court to comprehensively protect the interests of the child, and 
then grant a presumption of validity to the court’s determination. The initial 
assumption should be that the court appropriately considers the interests of 
the minor, and thus properly accounts for the child’s interests. Whoever 
wishes to argue otherwise should bear the burden of proof. That 
determination should also serve as binding precedent for a subsequent court.  
The second model suggests creating clear legislative guidelines for 
defining the best interests of the child in order to avoid future relitigation. 
The establishment of guidelines for child support results in the finality of 
child support judgments in later disputes. The American, Australian, and 
Canadian systems adopt this approach, to varying extents. Some of the 
systems have even transferred the determination of child support matters to 
administrative entities, drastically restricting judicial discretion. These 
entities implement an established formula based on the objective data of the 
parents; this standardized system makes it difficult to initiate relitigation by 
arguing that the interest of the minors was compromised. The Israeli system 
is likely to move in this direction as well, though it currently still relies on 
abstract terms in determining child support, making it easier to relitigate on 
behalf of the minor.       
The third model appoints independent representation for the minor. 
Such representation adds the minor as a party to the proceedings, thereby 
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ensuring finality of judgment. Decisions in proceedings with independent 
representatives should be given the validity of a final judgment. Several 
models are available for determining who should serve as the minor’s 
representative, including a zealous attorney, a social worker, or a friend of 
the court.   
These models, or a combination of them, can be used to create a 
formula for more appropriately balancing the competing interests and 
concerns in family law proceedings. Such a system could protect the 
interests of the minor while, at the same time, preserving contractual 
certainty and the stability of agreements between spouses. 
